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Abstract
We propose the scheme that mitigates the adver-
sarial perturbation  on the adversarial example
Xadv (= X ± , X is a benign sample) by sub-
tracting the estimated perturbation ˆ from X + 
and adding ˆ toX − . The estimated perturbation
ˆ comes from the difference betweenXadv and its
moving-averaged outcome Wavg ∗ Xadv where
Wavg isN×N moving average kernel that all the
coefficients are one. Usually, the adjacent sam-
ples of an image are close to each other such that
we can let X ≈Wavg ∗X (naming this relation
after X-MAS[X minus Moving Averaged Sam-
ples]). By doing that, we can make the estimated
perturbation ˆ falls within the range of . The
scheme is also extended to do the multi-level mit-
igation by configuring the mitigated adversarial
example Xadv ± ˆ as a new adversarial example
to be mitigated. The multi-level mitigation gets
Xadv closer to X with a smaller (i.e. mitigated)
perturbation than original unmitigated perturba-
tion by setting the moving averaged adversarial
sample Wavg ∗Xadv (which has the smaller per-
turbation than Xadv if X ≈ Wavg ∗ X) as the
boundary condition that the multi-level mitigation
cannot cross over (i.e. decreasing  cannot go
below and increasing  cannot go beyond). With
the multi-level mitigation, we can get high predic-
tion accuracies even in the adversarial example
having a large perturbation (i.e.  > 16). The
proposed scheme is evaluated with adversarial ex-
amples crafted by the FGSM (Fast Gradient Sign
Method) based attacks on ResNet-50 trained with
ImageNet dataset.
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Gyeonggi-do, South Korea. Correspondence to: Woohyung Chun
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1. Introduction
Adversarial perturbations (Kurakin et al., 2016a; Carlini
& Wagner, 2016; Guo et al., 2018) for a CNN (Convolu-
tional Neural Network) are crafted to make a CNN classifier
mispredict its input image. Usually, perturbations are imper-
ceptible to human eyes especially when their size(as known
as )s are small (i.e.  ≤ 16 in the FGSM [Fast Gradient
Sign Method] based attack (Kurakin et al., 2016a)). How-
ever, even in the case that an adversarial perturbation on an
input image is large (> 16), human beings can classify the
image with a correct label.
For the defense of a CNN against the adversarially per-
turbed images, there have been the approaches (Buckman
et al., 2018; Guo et al., 2017; Papernot et al., 2015; Kurakin
et al., 2016b) to make neural networks robust against the
perturbations. Fundamentally, the approaches need to have
a full data set of neural networks for a re-training. Also,
there are some other approaches which do not require any
modification of neural networks (Kurakin et al., 2016a; Dz-
iugaite et al., 2016; Prakash et al., 2018). The approaches
utilize the property that adversarial perturbations tend to
exist on a high-frequency region (Guo et al., 2018; Sharma
et al., 2019). Thus, the low-pass image filter (i.e. DCT [Dis-
crete Cosine Transform] or wavelet denoising) deletes the
perturbations on a high-frequency region by cutting off high-
frequency components. However, they are not so effective
for the adversarial example having a large perturbation (Dz-
iugaite et al., 2016).
The image transformations such as DCT and wavelet were
developed to make the image with less information (i.e.
compressed one with less bits) seemingly have a good qual-
ity comparable to original one for human beings. They
utilize that human beings are not sensitive to small changes
of an image. If the techniques originally developed for the
less-sensitive human beings (not for the defense against the
adversarial perturbations) can be used to invalidate a rela-
tively small perturbation (i.e.  ≤ 16), it would be able to
nullify a large perturbation if we can make the large pertur-
bation become a smaller one that the image transformation
can delete.
For the mitigation of an adversarial perturbation  of the
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adversarial example Xadv (= X ± ), we find the estimated
perturbation ˆ and add it to Xadv in the direction of making
|| small (i.e. Xadv − ˆ for + , Xadv + ˆ for − ). The
estimated perturbation comes from the difference between
Xadv and its moving-averaged outcomeWavg ∗Xadv where
Wavg is N ×N moving average kernel that all the coeffi-
cients are one. Since X ≈Wavg ∗X among the adjacent
samples of an image, we can make the difference between
Xadv and Wavg ∗Xadv less than . For a large adversarial
perturbation (e.g.  > 16), the mitigation scheme is ex-
tended to do the multi-level mitigation by configuring the
mitigated adversarial example as a new adversarial example
to be mitigated further. Also, in order to guarantee that more
mitigation steps get the adversarial perturbation smaller, the
less perturbed moving averaged sample (i.e. Wavg ∗Xadv
is closer to X than Xadv if X ≈ Wavg ∗ X) is set as the
boundary condition that the mitigation by subtraction (Xadv
− ˆ) does not go below and the mitigation by addition (Xadv
+ ˆ) does not go beyond.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 sets up the
function M(·) which mitigates a large perturbation that
JPEG encoding cannot nullify. M(·) is dedicated to making
the large perturbation small such that JPEG encoding is sep-
arated as the soothing function from M(·). In Section 3, the
way of estimating perturbation is introduced on X-MAS (i.e.
when X ≈Wavg ∗X) and it is extended to the multilevel-
mitigation for a large perturbation. In the end of the section,
the proposed mitigation schemes are built in an algorithm
with some relevant parameters. Section 4 evaluates the algo-
rithm with some representing adversarial examples having
large perturbations. Finally, Section 5 concludes with the
summary of our contribution.
2. Problem Setup
Previous researches (Kurakin et al., 2016a; Dziugaite et al.,
2016; Guo et al., 2018; Sharma et al., 2019) identified that
JPEG encoding is able to nullify the impact of the adver-
sarial perturbations on the prediction accuracy of a CNN.
When the adversarial example Xadv is JPEG-encoded and
then fed into a CNN which recognizes the benign version
of Xadv , X as Ytrue,
Pr[Ytrue|X] ≈ Pr[Ytrue|JPEG(Xadv)],
Xadv = X ± ,  ≥ 0
(1)
where Pr[Ytrue|X] is the accuracy that a CNN predicts
X as the true label Ytrue and  is the adversarial pertur-
bation applied to all the samples of an input image for a
CNN. Usually, the relation ”≈” of Equation (1) works well
for the small perturbations but it is not valid for the large
perturbations as shown in Figure 1.
In Figure 1, the perturbations s are crafted by the basic
Pr[Ytrue|JPEG(Xadv)] = 0.9528
0.9528 - "n06794110 street sign"
0.0243 - "n03000134 chainlink fence"
0.0154 - "n06874185 traffic light, traffic 
signal, stoplight"
Pr[Ytrue|X] = 0.9763
Pr[Ytrue|X]      Pr[Ytrue|JPEG(Xadv)]
(a) JPEG encoding can well soothe the small perturba-
tions generated by the basic iterative FGSM attack with
 = 2.
Pr[Ytrue|JPEG(Xadv)] = 0.0018
0.9975 - "n03000134 chainlink fence"
0.0018 - "n06794110 street sign"
0.0004 - "n04604644 worm fence, snake 
fence, snake-rail fence, Virginia fence"
Pr[Ytrue|X]      Pr[Ytrue|JPEG(Xadv)]
Pr[Ytrue|X] = 0.9763
(b) JPEG encoding cannot well soothe the large pertur-
bations crafted by the basic iterative FGSM attack with
 = 32.
Figure 1. JPEG encoding does not work well for a large perturba-
tion.
iterative FGSM attack (Kurakin et al., 2016a). Figure 1a
satisfies the relation ”≈” of Equation (1) but Figure 1b does
not. JPEG(·) compresses the image with the quality of 20
(out of 100). In order to make Figure 1b have the prediction
accuracy comparable to Figure 1a, we need to mitigate
Xadv of Figure 1b to the level of Xadv in Figure 1a. Let
the mitigation function M(·) that mitigates the adversarial
perturbation  of Equation (1) be
M(Xadv) = Xadv ± ˆ
= X ± ∓ ˆ, 0 ≤ ˆ ≤ 
(2)
where ˆ is the estimated perturbation which mitigates the
perturbation by subtracting ˆ for  > 0 and adding ˆ for  <
0. To make the difference between M(Xadv) and Xadv be
imperceptible to human eyes, ˆ must be within the range of
. That is, ˆ should work on the direction of decreasing the
range of  from [−, +] to [− + ˆ, + − ˆ] where 0 ≤ ˆ
≤ . In Equation (2), ˆ is subtracted for Xadv = X +  and
it is added to Xadv = X − . By applying the mitigation
functionM(·), Equation (1) can be expressed with the terms
as below
Pr[Ytrue|X] ≈ Pr[Ytrue|SF (M(Xadv))],
Xadv = X ± ,
M(Xadv) = Xadv ± ˆ, 0 ≤ ˆ ≤ 
(3)
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where SF (·) is the soothing function corresponding to
JPEG encoding in Equation (1). Soothing function re-
duces the impact of the perturbation on the prediction accu-
racy. As a soothing function, JPEG encoding removes the
high-frequency perturbations through DCT (Discrete Co-
sine Transform) and quantization (Guo et al., 2018; Sharma
et al., 2019). Also, the simple moving average filter (which
runs the convolutional computations with the weight ker-
nel where all the coefficients are one) can be used as the
soothing function by smoothing the perturbations through
the spatial average. In Section 3, we propose the method of
estimating ˆ in Equation (2) and the way of mitigating the
adversarial perturbation using ˆ.
3. Proposed method
3.1. Estimated perturbation ˆ
In order to find ˆ, we use the moving average filters that
make Xadv converge some value ranging from [X − , X +
]. That is,
Wavg ∗Xadv = Wavg ∗X ±Wavg ∗  (4)
where  ≥ 0 and Wavg is N × N (N ≥ 2) moving aver-
age window whose samples are convolved with the kernel
that all the coefficients are one. The moving average oper-
ation ”Wavg∗” decreases the difference between adjacent
samples. Thus, the moving-average operation mitigates the
perturbation  as below.
Wavg ∗Xadv −Wavg ∗X = ±Wavg ∗ ,
Wavg ∗ || < || if ( 1|Wavg|
|Wavg|−1∑
n=0
n) 6= ,
Wavg ∗  =  if ( 1|Wavg|
|Wavg|−1∑
n=0
n) = 
(5)
where |Wavg| is the number of coefficients forN×N Wavg ,
N2 and n is the perturbation assigned to each sample that
Wavg covers. In Equation(5), the cases satisfyingWavg ∗ ||
< || are more probable than the cases that meet Wavg ∗ =
. For example, in order to makeWavg∗=  in FGSM (Fast
Gradient Sign Method) attack (Goodfellow et al., 2014), all
the samples in the coverage of Wavg have . The probability
that each sample has the same  in FGSM is 13 (i.e + among−, 0 and +). So, the probability that the result of N ×N
moving-average computation becomes  is 1
3N2
. Its value is
about 5× 10−5 when 3× 3 kernel is used for Wavg . In the
same manner, we can find the probability that the result of
N ×N moving-average computation becomes − and it is
also 1
3N2
. Thus, when  is generated by the rule of FGSM
and the moving average kernelWavg is 3×3, the probability
that the inequality Wavg ∗ || < || happens is 1 − 2332 (≈
0.9999). Since it is highly probable that Wavg ∗ || < ||,
we can use || −Wavg ∗ || as the estimated perturbation ˆ
in order to make  smaller. When X ≈Wavg ∗X , ˆ can be
found by
∀Xadv > Wavg ∗Xadv,
ˆ = Xadv − (Wavg ∗Xadv)
= X + −Wavg ∗ (X + )
≈ −Wavg ∗  (∵ X ≈Wavg ∗X),
∀Xadv < Wavg ∗Xadv,
ˆ = (Wavg ∗Xadv)−Xadv
= Wavg ∗ (X − )− (X − )
≈ −Wavg ∗  (∵ X ≈Wavg ∗X)
(6)
where  > 0, Xadv = X +  if the moving average output
of Xadv is smaller than Xadv (i.e. Xadv > Wavg ∗Xadv)
and Xadv = X −  if the moving average output of Xadv
is larger than Xadv ((i.e. Xadv < Wavg ∗ Xadv). X ≈
Wavg ∗X can be satisfied by controlling |Wavg| (usually,
adjacent samples are close to each other).
In Equation (6), 0< ˆ <  such that ˆ can mitigate  by either
being subtracted from  or being added to  That is, when
Xadv > Wavg ∗ Xadv, ˆ is subtracted from Xadv and ˆ is
added to Xadv if Xadv <Wavg ∗Xadv . Figure 2 illustrates
how ˆ mitigates .
X + ε 
-ε 
Xadv
Xadv 
1
^
+ε ^
X – ε    Xadv    X + ε 
1
X
 
X – ε 
X + ε - ε
X – ε + ε 
X – ε + ε  < Xadv < X + ε - ε
^
^
^ ^
Figure 2. Illustration of mitigating  with ˆ
In Figure 2, the solid black line shows the upper and lower
limits where the adversarial perturbation  works on X .
Thus, the red line which denotes the adversarial example
Xadv having ± as the adversarial perturbation, does not
get out of the black line. Also, the solid green line indicates
the upper and lower boundaries that ˆ works on Xadv . If (X
+  − ˆ) < Xadv < (X + ), Xadv has the positive  such
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that ˆ (=  −Wavg ∗ ) should be subtracted from Xadv to
reduce +. On the other hand, if (X − ) < Xadv < (X −
 + ˆ), Xadv has the negative . Thus, ˆ should be added
into Xadv to increase −. Both Xadv + ˆ and Xadv − ˆ
are closer to X than X +  and X −  are. In the same
manner with Xadv, the solid blue line that represents the
adversarial exampleX1adv having±(− ˆ) as the adversarial
perturbation, does not get out of the green line. If ˆ = 0
(i.e. Xadv = Wavg ∗ Xadv), all the samples within the
coverage of Wavg have the same . As discussed earlier,
the probability that all the samples have the same  is very
low even in the small 3× 3 Wavg. It is much smaller than
the probability that  of Xadv is 0 (e.g. 13 in the FGSM
based attack). Thus, when ˆ= 0, it is more probable that the
perturbation of Xadv is zero rather than that all the samples
have the same . Since we do not have to find ˆ for the
sample having no perturbation, we do not change Xadv in
case that ˆ = 0.
In Equation (6), ˆ can be larger than  if X 6≈ Wavg ∗
X . It is the case that samples within the moving average
kernel are very different to each other. Then, ˆ may work as
another perturbation. Also, ˆ can be too small to improve
the prediction accuracy Pr[Ytrue|(Xadv ± ˆ)]. For both
large and small ˆ, more mitigation steps would be required.
Figure 3 shows the impact of the single-level mitigation on
the prediction accuracy according to the sizes of  in Xadv .
Pr[Ytrue|X] = 0.9763
Pr[Ytrue|Wavg*(Xadv +/– ε)] = 0.6874
0.6874 - "n06794110 street sign"
0.1336 - "n03000134 chainlink fence"
0.0489 - "n06874185 traffic light, traffic signal, stoplight"
^
Pr[Ytrue|JPEG(Xadv +/– ε)] = 0.9523
0.9523 - "n06794110 street sign"
0.0212 - "n03000134 chainlink fence"
0.0144 - "n06874185 traffic light, traffic signal, stoplight"
^
(a) Single-level mitigation can well mitigate the small
perturbations crafted by the basic iterative FGSM attack
with  = 2.
Pr[Ytrue|X] = 0.9763
Pr[Ytrue|Wavg*(Xadv +/– ε)] = 0.0023
0.9886 - "n03000134 chainlink fence"
0.0070 - "n04604644 worm fence, snake fence, snake-rail 
fence, Virginia fence"
0.0023 - "n06794110 street sign"
^
Pr[Ytrue|JPEG(Xadv +/– ε)] = 0.0379
0.9555 - "n03000134 chainlink fence"
0.0379 - "n06794110 street sign"
0.0023 - "n04604644 worm fence, snake fence, snake-rail 
fence, Virginia fence"
^
(b) Single-level mitigation may not work well on large
perturbations crafted by the basic iterative FGSM attack
with  = 32.
Figure 3. Impact of the single-level mitigation on the prediction
accuracy according to the sizes of  in Xadv
In Figure 3, |Wavg| = 3 × 3 for both ˆ and the sooth-
ing filter ”Wavg∗” of Pr[Ytrue|Wavg ∗ (Xadv + / − ˆ)].
JPEG(·) compresses the image in the quality with 20 (out
of 100). Figure 3a shows the case where single-level mitiga-
tion works very well on the small perturbations to get the
high prediction accuracy. However, the single-level mitiga-
tion is not so effective on the large perturbation in Figure
3b. In order to achieve a high prediction accuracy on the
adversarial example having large perturbations, we need to
run a multi-level mitigation in a controlled manner.
3.2. Multi-level mitigation
The single-level mitigation with the estimated perturbation
ˆ in Equation (6) makes a new adversarial example X1adv
that ranges (Xadv + ˆ0, Xadv − ˆ0) where Xadv for the
lower boundary is X − , Xadv for the upper limit is X +
 and ˆ0 is ˆ of Equation (6). In order to find the upper and
lower boundaries for X2adv which is mitigated from X
1
adv,
we need to estimate the perturbation ˆ1 at both ends of the
range for X1adv .
∀Xadv − ˆ0,
ˆ1 = (Xadv − ˆ0)−Wavg ∗ (Xadv − ˆ0)
= (X + − ˆ0)−Wavg ∗ (X + − ˆ0)
≈ − ˆ0 −Wavg ∗ (− ˆ0) (∵ X ≈Wavg ∗X),
∀Xadv + ˆ0,
ˆ1 = Wavg ∗ (Xadv + ˆ0)− (Xadv + ˆ0)
= Wavg ∗ (X − + ˆ0)− (X − + ˆ0)
≈ − ˆ0 −Wavg ∗ (− ˆ0) (∵ X ≈Wavg ∗X)
where ˆ0 =  −Wavg ∗  such that
ˆ1 = Wavg ∗ (−Wavg ∗ )
= Wavg ∗ ˆ0.
Since it is more probable that Wavg ∗ |ˆ0| < |ˆ0|, |ˆ1| < |ˆ0|.
Thus, |ˆ1| < |ˆ0| < || since |ˆ0| < ||. Figure 4 illustrates
the multi-level mitigation that estimates ˆ1.
Xadv
 Xadv – ε0 
Xadv + ε0 ^
-ε1 ^
+ε1 ^
^^  = Xadv – ε1  
                   
1 ^
Xadv + ε0 + ε1  = Xadv + ε1  ^^
1 ^
^
Xadv 
1
Xadv 
2
Xadv – ε0 – ε1                  
+ε0 ^
-ε0 ^
^
X + ε 
 
X  
X – ε 
    
X - ε + ε0 < Xadv < X + ε - ε0
1 ^
^X - ε + ε0 + ε1< Xadv < X + ε - ε0  - ε1
2 ^^ ^
Figure 4. Illustration of the multi-level mitigation
In Figure 4, the grey line is the boundary condition forXadv
(corresponding to the solid black line of Figure 2), the solid
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black line denotes the range of X1adv and the green line
represents the upper and lower boundaries that X2adv can
reach. As the level of mitigation goes deep, the accumulated
sum of the estimated perturbations grows even though the
estimated perturbation per each level decreases. Therefore,
we should control ˆ to satisfy the following.
p∑
n=0
|ˆn| < || , |ˆp| < · · · < |ˆ1| < |ˆ0| < || (7)
where p is the level of mitigation. However, in Equation (7),
 cannot be directly handled as a single term because it is
hidden in Xadv. In order to control ˆ, Equation (7) should
be rephrased as below.
X + − ˆ0 − ˆ1 · · · − ˆp−1 − ˆp > X − ,
X − + ˆ0 + ˆ1 · · ·+ ˆp−1 + ˆp < X + . (8)
In case that adjacent samples are very different to each
other, X 6≈Wavg ∗X such that the estimated perturbation
at the p-th step of the multi-level mitigation, ˆp can be too
large to satisfy Equation (8). Since usually X > , the
large difference that breaks the relation of Equation (8) may
come from the difference between the benign parts (i.e. X
of Xadv). To relax the impact of the large differences on
the estimated perturbations, we normalize the estimated
perturbation at the p-th step of the multi-level mitigation as
below.
ˆp = E[|Xpadv − (Wavg ∗Xpadv)|] (9)
where E[| · |] indicates both E[Xpadv − (Wavg ∗Xpadv)] (to
be subtracted from Xp−1adv ) and E[(Wavg ∗Xpadv)−Xpadv]
(to be added into Xp−1adv ). This normalization also prevents
ˆp from working as a serious perturbation for Xadv having
 = 0 (∵ the mitigation scheme should work for the benign
example).
In Equation(8), the boundary condition for both decreasing
perturbation Xp−1adv − ˆ and increasing perturbation Xp−1adv +
ˆ better be replaced with the value closer toX . As discussed
earlier with Equation (5), the probability for Wavg ∗ || <
|| is much larger than Wavg ∗ || = || such that it is more
probable that Wavg ∗Xadv is closer to X than X ±  when
Wavg ∗X ≈ X . That is,
∀Xadv = X + ,
Wavg ∗Xadv = Wavg ∗ (X + )
= X +Wavg ∗  (∵Wavg ∗X ≈ X)
< X +  (∵Wavg ∗ || < ||),
∀Xadv = X − ,
Wavg ∗Xadv = Wavg ∗ (X − )
= X −Wavg ∗  (∵Wavg ∗X ≈ X)
> X −  (∵Wavg ∗ || < ||).
Thus, bothX −  andX +  of Equation (8) can be replaced
with Wavg ∗Xadv as following.
Xp−1adv − ˆp > Wavg ∗Xadv,
Xp−1adv + ˆp < Wavg ∗Xadv. (10)
Equation (10) guarantees that the proposed multi-level mit-
igation gets Xadv closer to X with the smaller (i.e. miti-
gated) perturbation having the same polarity with the origi-
nal (i.e. unmitigated) perturbation if X ≈Wavg ∗X . That
is, the term of decreasing , Xp−1adv − ˆp does not go below
Wavg ∗Xadv and the term of increasing , Xp−1adv + ˆp does
not go beyond Wavg ∗ Xadv. To this end, Wavg ∗ Xadv
can be used as the decision boundary that determines the
maximum mitigation step where the prediction accuracy
does not change any longer. Figure 5 shows that the 70-step
multi-level mitigation satisfying Equation (10) is applied to
the adversarial example having  = 32 of Figure 3.
1) Pr[Ytrue|Wavg*(M(Xadv))] = 0.0202
0.9443 - "n03000134 chainlink fence"
0.0202 - "n06794110 street sign"
M(·): 70-step multi-level mitigation
Soothing function:
1) Wavg* : 3x3 moving average
2) JPEG(·) : JPEG encoding
2) Pr[Ytrue|JPEG(M(Xadv))] = 0.7229 
0.7229 - "n06794110 street sign"
0.2068 - "n03000134 chainlink fence"
(a) 70-step multi-level mitigation gets higher prediction
accuracy than the single-level mitigation of Figure 3b.
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
Pr[Ytrue|SF(M(Xadv))] when M is multi-level mitigation and SF is JPEG encoding with
quality=20 (out of 100)
  0     5    10    15   20    25    30    35   40    45    50    55   60    65    70   75    80    85   90    95   100
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
0.035
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
Pr[Ytrue|SF(M(Xadv))] when M is multi-level mitigation and SF is moving average
   0     5    10    15   20    25   30   35    40   45   50    55   60    65   70   75    80   85    90   95   100
# of steps for multi-level mitigation
# of steps for multi-level mitigation
Prediction accuracy
Prediction accuracy
Multi-level mitigation saturates the prediction accuracy 
from the step 45 regardless of soothing functions
(b) The boundary condition, Equation (10) for multi-
level mitigation guarantees a certain level of the en-
hanced prediction regardless of soothing functions.
Figure 5. The proposed multi-level mitigation enhances the predic-
tion accuracy of Figure 3b in a controlled manner.
In Figure 5, even though the prediction accuracies of Figure
5a are different according to soothing filters, the mitigation
step where their prediction accuracies do not change any
longer is same as shown in Figure 5b. This means that the
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boundary conditions of Equation (10) guarantee a certain
level of prediction accuracy if the number of mitigation
steps are large enough like the 70-step multi-level mitigation
of Figure 5. Thanks to Equation (10), we can build the
algorithmic state machine having the point where the multi-
level mitigation stops at.
3.3. Algorithm
Algorithm 1 summarizes the proposed method of mitigating
adversarial perturbations.
Among the inputs of Algorithm 1, Xadv and Wavg are used
to estimate ˆj and other parameters are related to the con-
dition to stop the multi-level mitigation. As demonstrated
in the previous sections, the proposed mitigation scheme
has no dependency on the soothing filter and neural network
architecture. However, the soothing filter and a CNN infer-
ence are required to check if the prediction accuracy gets
saturated or not. Also, there should be an array having the
size of k (which stores the previous prediction results) as the
input parameter of the algorithm in order to see if the pre-
diction accuracy of the current mitigation step is saturated
or not.
4. Evaluation of proposed method
For the evaluation of the proposed mitigation scheme de-
scribed in Algorithm 1,  is crafted by FGSM (Fast Gradient
Sign Method) attacks (Kurakin et al., 2016a) on ResNet-
50 (He et al., 2015) trained with ImageNet (Deng et al.,
2009). Thus, the input parameter ”CNN” of Algorithm 1 is
ResNet-50. Also, both JPEG encoding and 3 × 3 moving
average filter for the variable ”SF”. We repeat the mitigation
until the prediction accuracy gets into a saturated point such
that we do not specify the parameter k for this evaluation.
The core part (i.e. estimating perturbations and checking the
boundary condition for multi-level mitigation) of Algorithm
1 are written in ”convert” script of ImageMagick (Unknown,
2013). The script to find ˆ with 3 × 3 Wavg is found in
Appendix A 1 .
First of all, the proposed mitigation scheme should work
for the case where  = 0 since it does not know if its input
image has any adversarial perturbation or not. Algorithm 1
keeps mitigating the perturbation unless it crosses over the
boundary condition of Wavg ∗ Xadv. When Xadv has no
perturbation, the boundary condition becomes Wavg ∗ X .
Also, the estimated perturbation ˆ comes from the difference
between X and Wavg ∗X . Since the proposed scheme is
valid for the case X ≈Wavg ∗X , ˆ for  does not make the
1Other scripts and adversarial examples used for this evalua-
tion are avaiable at https://github.com/stonylinux/
mitigating_large_adversarial_perturbations_
on_X-MAS
Algorithm 1 Mitigating adversarial perturbations
1: //Xadv is the adversarial example.
2: //ˆ is the estimated perturbation.
3: //Wavg is N ×N moving average kernel.
4: //Xjadv is the adversarial example at the j-th step mitigation
5: //ˆj is the estimated perturbation at the j-step mitigation
6: //Wavg ∗Xadv is the local expectation that Wavg covers.
7: //k is the size of an array having CNN inference results from
X
j−(k−1)
adv to X
j
adv
8: //SF is the soothing filter like JPEG encoding
9: //CNN is a convolutional neural network
10:
11: Input: Xadv , Wavg , k, SF, CNN
12: //initial step j is set to zero
13: j = 0;
14: //initialize the variable that counts the number of consecutive
k-steps
15: //whose prediction accuracies are same
16: equal count = 0;
17: repeat
18: if Xjadv ≥ (Wavg ∗Xjadv) then
19: //Find ˆj to be subtracted from Xj−1adv
20: ˆj =Xjadv − (Wavg ∗Xjadv);
21: //Mitigate the perturbation with ˆj iff ˆj ≤ ˆj−1
22: if (j > 0 ) && ( ˆj ≤ ˆj−1 ) then
23: //Subtract ˆj from Xj−1adv
24: //if and only if this subtraction meets Equation (10)
25: if (Xj−1adv − ˆj) >Wavg ∗Xadv then
26: Xjadv =X
j−1
adv − ˆj ;
27: else
28: Xjadv =X
j−1
adv ;
29: end if
30: end if
31: else
32: //Find ˆj to be added to Xj−1adv
33: ˆj = (Wavg ∗Xjadv) −Xjadv;
34: //Mitigate the perturbation with ˆj iff ˆj ≤ ˆj−1
35: if (j > 0 ) && ( ˆj ≤ ˆj−1 ) then
36: //Add ˆj to Xj−1adv
37: //if and only if this addition satisfies Equation (10)
38: if (Xj−1adv + ˆj) <Wavg ∗Xadv then
39: Xjadv =X
j−1
adv + ˆj ;
40: else
41: Xjadv =X
j−1
adv ;
42: end if
43: end if
44: end if
45: //Stop the mitigation if the results of consecutive k-steps
are same
46: //Pop-and-Push to store new result
47: for i = 0 to k − 1 do
48: result[k-i] = result[k-(i+1)];
49: end for
50: result[0] = CNN(SF(Xjadv);
51: //Check if the results of consecutive k-steps are same or
not
52: for n = 0 to k − 2 do
53: if result[n] != result[n+1] then
54: break;
55: end if
56: end for
57: equal count = n;
58: until equal count is k − 2
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prediction accuracy Pr[Ytrue|Algorithm1(X)] far differ-
ent from Pr[Ytrue|W ∗X] (i.e. Pr[Ytrue|Algorithm1(X)]
≈ Pr[Ytrue|W ∗X]) as shown in Figure 6.
X     Wavg*X ,  |Wavg| = 3x3  
(   Pr[Ytrue | X] = 0.9983 and Pr[Ytrue | Wavg*X] = 0.9854)
Pr[Ytrue|Algorithm1(X)] = 0.9858      Pr[Ytrue | Wavg*X] 
0.9858 - "n02701002 ambulance"
0.0097 - "n03977966 police van, police wagon, paddy wagon, patrol wagon, wagon, 
black Maria"
X     Wavg*X ,  |Wavg| = 3x3  
(   Pr[Ytrue | X] = 0.9698 and Pr[Ytrue | Wavg*X] = 0.9880)
Pr[Ytrue|Algorithm1(X)] = 0.9901       Pr[Ytrue | Wavg*X] 
0.9901 - "n02510455 giant panda, panda, panda bear, coon bear, Ailuropoda 
melanoleuca"
0.0060 - "n02500267 indri, indris, Indri indri, Indri brevicaudatus"
(a) Pr[Ytrue|Algorithm1(X)] ≈ Pr[Ytrue|X] when
Pr[Ytrue|X] ≈ Pr[Ytrue|Wavg ∗X].
X       Wavg*X,  |Wavg| = 3x3 
(   Pr[Ytrue | X] = 0.9738 and Pr[Ytrue | Wavg*X] = 0.4537)
Pr[Ytrue|Algorithm1(X)] = 0.5156       Pr[Ytrue | Wavg*X] 
0.5156 - "n07753592 banana"
0.0632 - "n03065424 coil, spiral, volute, whorl, helix"
(b) Pr[Ytrue|Algorithm1(X)] 6≈ Pr[Ytrue|X] but
Pr[Ytrue|Algorithm1(X)] ≈ Pr[Ytrue|Wavg ∗ X] when
Pr[Ytrue|X] 6≈ Pr[Ytrue|Wavg ∗X].
Figure 6. Algorithm 1 makes Pr[Ytrue|Algorithm1(X)] ≈
Pr[Ytrue|Wavg ∗X].
In Figure 6a, Pr[Ytrue|Algorithm1(X)] is slightly better
than Pr[Ytrue|Wavg ∗ X]. This means that X is purely
mitigated (i.e. perturbed) by the difference of benign parts
among adjacent samples but the mitigation does not work
as a serious perturbation since the difference (of benign
parts among adjacent samples) cannot make X cross over
the boundary condition Wavg ∗ X according to Equation
(10). When X 6≈ Wavg ∗ X in Figure 6b, Algorithm 1
keeps mitigating the perturbation (i.e. adding/subtracting
the difference between X and Wavg ∗X to/from X) until
Xpadv (Xadv in p-step mitigation, actually X
p for the case
 = 0) has the minimum distance from Wavg ∗X . As the
result, Pr[Ytrue|Algorithm1(X)] ≈ Pr[Ytrue|Wavg ∗X]
even though Pr[Ytrue|Algorithm1(X)] 6≈ Pr[Ytrue|X].
Most moving average outcomes for the input images of a
CNN are predicted as the same label with their original
images (i.e. Pr[Ytrue|X] ≈ Pr[Ytrue|Wavg ∗X]) because
the moving average convolution of the input image works
as the low-pass filter like human eyes. Figure 7 shows that
Algorithm 1 well estimates ˆj when X ≈Wavg ∗X .
In Figure 7, the rank of prediction accuracy should be care-
fully handled. When JPEG encoding is used as the sooth-
ing filter without the mitigation steps (i.e. for the case of
Pr[Ytrue|JPEG(Xadv)]), it achieves top-2 accuracy for
Figure 7a as well as it gets top-3 accuracy for Figure 7b.
X     Wavg*X,  |Wavg| = 3x3 
(   Pr[Ytrue |X] = 0.9983 and Pr[Ytrue | Wavg*X] = 0.9854)
Pr[Ytrue|Xadv] = 0.0000
Pr[Ytrue|JPEG(Xadv)] = 0.0285
0.9703 - "n03345487 fire engine, fire truck"
0.0285 - "n02701002 ambulance"
Pr[Ytrue|JPEG(Algorithm1(Xadv))] = 0.9849 
0.9849 - "n02701002 ambulance"
0.0138 - "n03345487 fire engine, fire truck"
(a) Algorithm 1 increases the prediction accuracy from 0.0285
to 0.9849 when the basic iterative FGSM attack with  = 32
is applied.
Pr[Ytrue|Xadv] = 0.0000
X     Wavg*X,  |Wavg| = 3x3
 (   Pr[Ytrue | X] = 0.9698 and Pr[Ytrue | Wavg*X] = 0.9880)
Pr[Ytrue|JPEG(Algorithm1(Xadv))] = 0.8349 
0.8349 - "n02510455 giant panda, panda, panda bear, coon bear, 
Ailuropoda melanoleuca"
Pr[Ytrue|JPEG(Xadv)] = 0.0699
0.5461 - "n02483362 gibbon, Hylobates lar"
...
0.0699 - "n02510455 giant panda, panda, panda bear, coon bear, 
Ailuropoda melanoleuca"
(b) Algorithm 1 improves the prediction accuracy from 0.0699
to 0.8349 when the basic iterative FGSM attack with  = 32
is applied.
Figure 7. The proposed mitigation contributes to the enhancement
of prediction accuracy much more than JPEG encoding does.
However, both cases work well as the adversarial exam-
ples having dominant prediction accuracies. Especially for
Pr[Ytrue|JPEG(Xadv)] of Figure 7a, no one can say it
is okay to reach the top-2 accuracy with the probability
of 0.0285 because the wrong recognition can be fatal to a
human life (i.e. fire truck cannot replace the ambulance).
Thus, when we talk about the prediction accuracy, the num-
ber in probability can be much more important than the rank
of the accuracy. Figure 8 shows the cases that the num-
ber in probability plays an important role in the proposed
mitigation.
Figure 8 shows the cases that Pr[Ytrue|X] 6≈
Pr[Ytrue|Wavg ∗ X]. Figure 8a does not have Ytrue
(∵ ImageNet dataset does not have the label corresponding
to sunflower) and Figure 8b has far different numbers
for Pr[Ytrue|X] and Pr[Ytrue|Wavg ∗ X]. In Figure
8a, Pr[Ydaisy|X] becomes the ground truth because the
CNN inference having no label for sunflower recognizes
X as daisy (i.e. Ydaisy). Algorithm 1 increases the
prediction accuracy for Ydaisy from 0.1187 to 0.4805
because Pr[Ydaisy|X] ≈ Pr[Ydaisy|Wavg ∗X]. However,
in Figure 8b, even though both ranks of the prediction
accuracies Pr[Ytrue|X] and Pr[Ytrue|Wavg ∗ X] are
dominant (i.e. top-1 rank), the proposed mitigation does
not improve the prediction accuracy very much because
Pr[Ytrue|X] 6≈ Pr[Ytrue|Wavg ∗ X] (i.e. the difference
between X and Wavg ∗X works as a perturbation). Also,
larger |Wavg| is better for Algorithm 1 if the corresponding
Wavg satisfies Pr[Ytrue|X] ≈ Pr[Ytrue|Wavg ∗X] with a
high probability. It is because ˆ (i.e. the difference between
Xadv and Wavg ∗ Xadv) can be better normalized with
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Pr[Ydaisy|Xadv] = 0.0000
X     Wavg*X,  |Wavg| = 3x3
 (   Pr[Ydaisy | X] = 0.8675 and Pr[Ydaisy | Wavg*X] = 0.8303)
Pr[Ydaisy|JPEG(Algorithm1(Xadv))] = 0.4805
0.4805 - "n11939491 daisy"
0.2161 - "n04522168 vase"
Pr[Ydaisy|JPEG(Xadv)] = 0.1187
0.6809 - "n04522168 vase"
0.1187 - "n11939491 daisy"
(a) For the CNN recognizing sunflower as daisy, ˆ can be found
if Pr[Ydaisy|X]≈ Pr[Ydaisy|Wavg ∗X] (Xadv is generated
by the basic iterative FGSM attack with  = 32).
X      Wavg*X but same trend, |Wavg| = 3x3
(   Pr[Ytrue | X] = 0.9738 and Pr[Ytrue | Wavg*X] = 0.4537, 
but both are dominant top-1 ranked)
Pr[Ytrue|Xadv] = 0.0000
Pr[Ytrue|JPEG(Xadv)] = 0.0693
0.8655 - "n03627232 knot"
0.0693 - "n07753592 banana"
Pr[Ytrue|JPEG(Algorithm1(Xadv))] = 0.1040
...
0.1040 - "n07753592 banana"
(b) The proposed mitigation might not increase the prediction
accuracy very much if Pr[Ytrue|X] 6≈ Pr[Ytrue|Wavg ∗X]
(Xadv is generated by the basic iterative FGSM attack with 
= 32).
Figure 8. The proposed mitigation requires that Pr[Y |X] ≈
Pr[Y |Wavg ∗ X] rather than that the ranks of prediction accu-
racies are close.
larger |Wavg|. The details of the evaluation related to Wavg
are in Appendix B.
For the FGSM attack without clipping function (”fast” at-
tack in (Kurakin et al., 2016a)), the large perturbation can
seriously distort an image by generating out-of-bound sam-
ples. That is, it can make the samples in the range (0, )
become zero as well as it can increase the samples within
(255 − , 255) to have the maximum value, 255. Then, Al-
gorithm 1 would not well mitigate the perturbations because
the size of estimated perturbation |ˆ| can be reduced by the
amount of |−X| for the sample X in the range (0, ) or by
the amount of |X − (255− )| for X in the range (255 − ,
255). Figure 9 shows how the performance of Algorithm 1
varies according to the numbers of out-of-bound samples.
In Figure 9, fast FGSM attack is used to generate two dis-
tinct numbers of out-of-bound samples, which show the
impact of the out-of-bound samples on the performance of
Algorithm 1. The statistical numbers of (Red, Green, Blue)
tuples come from the ImageMagick convert script with the
option ”−format %c histogram:info: ”. In fast FGSM at-
tacks,  is the knob to control the number of out-of-bound
samples. The number of out-of-bound samples increases
when  goes up. Also, the number of out-of-bound samples
decreases as  goes down. In Figure 9, the adversarial exam-
ple generated by the fast FGSM attack with  = 16 has the
smaller number of out-of-bound samples than the adversar-
ial example that the fast FGSM attack with = 64 is applied
to (i.e. 682 vs 3573 for (0,0,0) tuples and 216 vs 3147
for (255,255,255) tuples). Larger number of out-of-bound
Among (Red, Green, Blue) 
tuples of X,
# of (0,0,0) = 4
# of (255,255,255) = 70
Benign image X  
Fast FGSM 
attack 
with ε = 64 
Among (Red, Green, Blue) tuples 
of Xadv, 
# of (0,0,0) = 3573
# of (255,255,255) = 3147
Fast FGSM 
attack 
with ε = 16 
Among (Red, Green, Blue) tuples 
of Xadv,
# of (0,0,0) = 682
# of (255,255,255) = 216
Among (Red, Green, Blue) 
tuples of Xadv,
# of (0,0,0) = 98
# of (255,255,255) = 74
Pr[Ytrue|Algorithm1(Xadv)] = 0.7356
when 7x7 Wavg is used to find ε 
Pr[Ytrue|Algorithm1(Xadv)] = 0.9517
when 7x7 Wavg is used to find ε 
Pr[Ytrue|Algorithm1(Xadv)] = 0.0014
when 7x7 Wavg is used to find ε 
Pr[Ytrue|X] = 0.9983
^
^^
Figure 9. Algorithm 1 works better for the adversarial example
which has the smaller number of out-of-bound samples.
samples makes more perceptible perturbations. Algorithm 1
shows the better performance (i.e. prediction accuracy repre-
sented as Pr[Ytrue|Algorithm1(Xadv)]) when the number
of out-of-bound samples is small (i.e. when the perturbation
is imperceptible). The number of out-of-bound samples
can be very different according to the attack methods. For
example, the adversarial example crafted by the iterative
least-likely FGSM attack with  = 64 has the smaller num-
ber of out-of-bound samples than the adversarial example
generated by the fast FGSM attack with  = 16. It is be-
cause the iterative least-likely FGSM attack has the clipping
function that reduces the number of out-of-bound samples.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we propose the scheme that mitigates the
perturbations on an adversarial example through the esti-
mation of the perturbations on X-MAS (X minus Moving
Average Samples i.e. when X ≈ Wavg ∗ X). For large
perturbations (i.e.  > 16), the scheme is further developed
to run the multi-step mitigation that has Wavg ∗Xadv as the
boundary condition to prevent the p-step mitigated adversar-
ial example Xpadv from getting worse by crossing over the
boundary. The multi-level mitigation gets Xadv closer to X
for the most adversarial examples whose benign part have
the relation that X ≈Wavg ∗X . We evaluate the proposed
algorithm with some representing examples that have the
different relations between X and Wavg ∗X . In the evalua-
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tion, our proposed scheme well mitigates the imperceptibly
crafted large adversarial perturbations (through iterative
FGSM attacks with a clipping function) such that it gets the
adversarial examples with the mitigated perturbations have
high prediction accuracies when X ≈Wavg ∗X .
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A. The script for 100-step multi-level mitigation
# ! / b i n / bash
#
# V e r s i o n f o r 3x3 e s t i m a t i o n
#
# To m i t i g a t e t h e a d v e r s a r i a l example ” a d v e r s a r i a l e x a m p l e . png ”
#
# . / m i t i g a t i n g a d v e r s a r i a l w i t h 3 x 3 e s t i m a t i o n . sh a d v e r s a r i a l e x a m p l e
#
# C a u t i o n ! ! ! A l l ” c o n v e r t ” commands b e t t e r be t y p e d i n one l i n e
# b e c a u s e −fx c o n t e n t w i t h i n ’ ’ does n o t s u p p o r t bash t y p e d l i n k i n g wi th ”\”
# The r e a s o n we s p l i t c o n v e r t command h e r e i s j u s t f o r t h e b e t t e r d i s p l a y
#
# I n i t i a l m i t i g a t i o n s t a r t s
#
# Find W {avg}∗X {adv}
c o n v e r t $1 . png −fx ’ ( ( p[−1,−1]+p [−1 ,0]+ p [−1 ,1]+ p [0 ,−1]+ p [ 0 , 1 ] + p [1 ,−1]+ p [ 1 , 0 ] + p [ 1 , 1 ] ) + p [ 0 , 0 ] ) / 9 ’ $1 ma0 . png
# Find X {adv} − W {avg}∗X {adv} f o r X {adv} > W {avg}∗X {adv}
c o n v e r t $1 . png $1 ma0 . png −fx ’ u [ 0 ] . p [0 ,0]−u [ 1 ] . p [ 0 , 0 ] ’ $1 meps0 . png
# Find W {avg}∗X {adv} − X {adv} f o r X {adv} < W {avg}∗X {adv}
c o n v e r t $1 ma0 . png $1 . png −fx ’ u [ 0 ] . p [0 ,0]−u [ 1 ] . p [ 0 , 0 ] ’ $1 peps0 . png
# Check t h e uppe r and lower bound of t h e m i t i g a t e d samples
#
# F o l l o w i n g i s j u s t f o r d i s p l a y e d
c o n v e r t $1 . png $1 meps0 . png $1 peps0 . png −fx ’ ( ( u [ 1 ] . p [0 ,0]> 0) && ( u [ 2 ] . p [ 0 , 0 ] = = 0) &&
( ( u [ 0 ] . p [ 0 , 0 ] − u [ 1 ] . mean ) > ( u [ 0 ] . minima ) ) ) ? u [ 0 ] . p [ 0 , 0 ] − u [ 1 ] . mean : ( ( u [ 1 ] . p [ 0 , 0 ] == 0) &&
( u [ 2 ] . p [0 ,0]> 0) && ( ( u [ 0 ] . p [ 0 , 0 ] + u [ 2 ] . mean ) < ( u [ 0 ] . maxima ) ) ) ? u [ 0 ] . p [ 0 , 0 ] + u [ 2 ] . mean : u [ 0 ] . p [ 0 , 0 ] ’
$ 1 m i t i g a t e d s t e p 0 . png
# I n i t i a l m i t i g a t i o n ends
# i t e r a t i v e m i t i g a t i o n s t a r t s
f o r i i n {0 . . 9 9}
do
c o n v e r t $ 1 m i t i g a t e d s t e p $ i . png −fx ’ ( ( p[−1,−1]+p [−1 ,0]+ p [−1 ,1]+ p [0 ,−1]+ p [ 0 , 1 ] + p [1 ,−1]+ p [ 1 , 0 ] + p [ 1 , 1 ] )
+p [ 0 , 0 ] ) / 9 ’ $1 ma$ ( ( i + 1 ) ) . png
c o n v e r t $ 1 m i t i g a t e d s t e p $ i . png $1 ma$ ( ( i + 1 ) ) . png −fx ’ u [ 0 ] . p [0 ,0]−u [ 1 ] . p [ 0 , 0 ] ’ $1 meps$ ( ( i + 1 ) ) . png
c o n v e r t $1 ma$ ( ( i + 1 ) ) . png $ 1 m i t i g a t e d s t e p $ i . png −fx ’ u [ 0 ] . p [0 ,0]−u [ 1 ] . p [ 0 , 0 ] ’ $1 peps$ ( ( i + 1 ) ) . png
# Check t h e uppe r and lower bound of t h e m i t i g a t e d samples
#
# DO NOT m i t i g a t e X {adv}ˆ{p−1}
#
# i f $\ h a t{\ e p s i l o n} {p} \geq \ h a t{\ e p s i l o n} {p−1}$
# or
# i f \ h a t{\ e p s i l o n} {p} \geq \ h a t{\ e p s i l o n} {p−1}
# or
# i f X {adv}ˆ{p−1} − \ h a t{\ e p s i l o n} {p} < W {avg}∗X {adv} ( f o r X {adv}ˆ{p−1} > W {avg}∗X {adv })
# o r
# i f X {adv}ˆ{p−1} + \ h a t{\ e p s i l o n} {p} > W {avg}∗X {adv} ( f o r X {adv}ˆ{p−1} < W {avg}∗X {adv })
#
c o n v e r t $ 1 m i t i g a t e d s t e p $ i . png $1 meps$ ( ( i + 1 ) ) . png $1 peps$ ( ( i + 1 ) ) . png $1 meps$ i . png $ 1 p e p s $ i . png
$1 ma0 . png −fx ’ ( ( u [ 1 ] . p [0 ,0]> 0) && ( u [ 2 ] . p [ 0 , 0 ] = = 0) && ( ( u [ 0 ] . p [ 0 , 0 ] − u [ 1 ] . mean ) >= ( u [ 5 ] . p [ 0 , 0 ] ) )
&& ( u [ 1 ] . mean < u [ 3 ] . mean ) ) ? u [ 0 ] . p [ 0 , 0 ] − u [ 1 ] . mean : ( ( u [ 2 ] . p [0 ,0]> 0) && ( u [ 1 ] . p [ 0 , 0 ] == 0) &&
( ( u [ 0 ] . p [ 0 , 0 ] + u [ 2 ] . mean ) <= ( u [ 5 ] . p [ 0 , 0 ] ) ) && ( u [ 2 ] . mean < u [ 4 ] . mean ) ) ? u [ 0 ] . p [ 0 , 0 ] + u [ 2 ] . mean : u [ 0 ] . p [ 0 , 0 ] ’
$ 1 m i t i g a t e d s t e p $ ( ( i + 1 ) ) . png
done
# i t e r a t i v e m i t i g a t i o n ends
# S o o t h i n g f i l t e r p a r t h e r e !
# 3x3 Moving a v e r a g e as a s o o t h i n g f i l t e r
c o n v e r t $ 1 m i t i g a t e d s t e p 1 0 0 . png −fx ’ ( ( p[−1,−1]+p [−1 ,0]+ p [−1 ,1]+ p [0 ,−1]+ p [ 0 , 1 ] + p [1 ,−1]+ p [ 1 , 0 ] + p [ 1 , 1 ] ) + p [ 0 , 0 ] ) / 9 ’
$ 1 m i t i g a t e d a n d s o o t h e d b y m a . png
# JPEG e n c o d i n g wi th t h e q u a l i t y 20 ( o u t o f 100)
c o n v e r t $ 1 m i t i g a t e d s t e p 1 0 0 . png −q u a l i t y 20 $ 1 m i t i g a t e d a n d s o o t h e d b y J P E G . j p g
Mitigating large adversarial perturbations on X-MAS (X minus Moving Averaged Samples)
B. Evaluation of Algorithm 1 related to a
moving-average kernel
Since larger |Wavg| can control the difference of estimated
perturbations between consecutive steps (i.e. ∆ ˆj,j−1 =
ˆj−1 - ˆj) in a finer-granule manner, Algorithm 1 with a
large |Wavg| can get Xadv closer to X so that it achieves
a highier prediction accuracy than Algorithm 1 with the
smaller |Wavg|. Figure 10 shows that Algorithm 1 with
a large |Wavg| gets the high prediction accuracy for the
adversarial example having a large perturbation (i.e.  =
64) when Pr[Ytrue|X] ≈ Pr[Ytrue|Wavg ∗X] with a high
probability.
Pr[Ytrue|Algorithm1(Xadv)] = 0.6118
0.6118 - "n02701002 ambulance"
0.3470 - "n03345487 fire engine, fire truck"
...
X     Wavg*X,  |Wavg| = 7x7
(∵  Pr[Ytrue |X] = 0.9983 and Pr[Ytrue |Wavg*X] = 0.8720)
Pr[Ytrue|JPEG(Algorithm1(Xadv))] = 0.9673
0.9673 - "n02701002 ambulance"
0.0135 - "n03796401 moving van"
(a) |Wavg| contributes more to the prediction accuracy when |Wavg|
is large and Pr[Ytrue|X]≈ Pr[Ytrue|Wavg∗X] (Xadv is generated
by the basic iterative FGSM attack with  = 64).
Pr[Ytrue|Algorithm1(Xadv)] = 0.0000
1.0000 - "n03345487 fire engine, fire truck"
...
0.0000 - "n02701002 ambulance"
X      Wavg*X  when |Wavg| = 3x3
(∵  Pr[Ytrue |X] = 0.9983 and Pr[Ytrue |Wavg*X] = 0.9854)
Pr[Ytrue|JPEG(Algorithm1(Xadv))] = 0.8630
0.8630 - "n02701002 ambulance"
0.1338 - "n03345487 fire engine, fire truck"
(b) Soothing filter (i.e. JPEG) contributes more to the predic-
tion accuracy when when |Wavg| is small and Pr[Ytrue|X] ≈
Pr[Ytrue|Wavg ∗X] (Xadv is generated by the basic iterative FGSM
attack with  = 64).
Figure 10. Large |Wavg| can make the proposed mitigation get a
high prediction accuracy without soothing filter if Pr[Ytrue|X] ≈
Pr[Ytrue|Wavg ∗X] with a high probability.
In Figure 10, both Figure 10a and 10b satisfy Pr[Ytrue|X]
≈ Pr[Ytrue|Wavg ∗ X] with a high probability. How-
ever, Algorithm 1 mitigates Figure 10a better than Fig-
ure 10b. In Figure 10a, Algorithm 1 can get some
high prediction accuracy even without JPEG encoding
(Pr[Ytrue|Algorithm1(Xadv)] = 0.6118) but it cannot get
any prediction accuracy (Pr[Ytrue|Algorithm1(Xadv)]
= 0.0000) in Figure 10b. In case that Pr[Ytrue|X] 6≈
Pr[Ytrue|Wavg ∗ X] and both prediction accuracies are
not so high, we can improve the prediction accuracy of the
adversarial example mitigated by Algorithm 1 by changing
the coefficients of Wavg . Figure 11 shows that changing the
coefficients of Wavg can improve the prediction accuracy
of the adversarial example mitigated by Algorithm 1 when
Pr[Ytrue|X] 6≈ Pr[Ytrue|Wavg ∗X].
Pr[Ytrue|JPEG(Algorithm1(Xadv))] = 
Pr[Ytrue|X] = 0.6997
Pr[Ytrue|Wavg*X] =  
0.8329  
where |Wavg|=3x3 and the coefficients of Wavg are all one
0.1515
where |Wavg|=7x7 and the coefficients of Wavg are all one
0.4007  
when 3x3 Wavg is used to find ε  
0.0016
when 7x7 Wavg is used to find ε  
^
^
(a) Algorithm 1 cannot improve the prediction accuracy of the adver-
sarial example Xadv (generated by the basic iterative FGSM attack
with = 64) very much when Pr[Ytrue|X] 6≈ Pr[Ytrue|Wavg ∗X].
Coefficient is 1 in 7x7 weight
Coefficient is (0.5)^2 in 7x7 weight
Coefficient is (0.5)^4 in 7x7 weight
Put different weights 
on the moving 
averaged sample
(b) Changing the coefficients of Wavg in Figure 11a by putting more
weights on the coefficients closer to the centroid of Wavg
Pr[Ytrue|X] = 0.6997  
 
Pr[Ytrue|Wavg*X] = 0.6652 
where |Wavg|=7x7 and coefficients of Wavg are different 
according to the distances from the center weight
Pr[Ytrue|JPEG(Algorithm1(Xadv))] = 0.5377
when 7x7 Wavg   is used to find ε ^
(c) Algorithm 1 works well on the adversarial example Xadv
(generated by the basic iterative FGSM attack with  = 64) af-
ter the coefficients of Wavg is changed to satisfy Pr[Ytrue|X] ≈
Pr[Ytrue|Wavg ∗X].
Figure 11. Changing the coefficients of Wavg can increase the pre-
diction accuracy of the adversarial example mitigated by Algorithm
1 when Pr[Ytrue|X] 6≈ Pr[Ytrue|Wavg ∗X].
In Figure 11a, Pr[Ytrue|X] 6≈ Pr[Ytrue|Wavg ∗X] when
the larger (i.e. 7 × 7) Wavg is used to find ˆ. In order to
make Pr[Ytrue|X] ≈ Pr[Ytrue|Wavg ∗X] for 7× 7 Wavg ,
7 × 7 Wavg needs to be changed to have the coefficients
which are similar to 3×3Wavg . To get the same result with
3× 3 Wavg by using 7× 7 Wavg , 3× 3 coefficients of the
centroid in 7× 7 Wavg are filled with ones and other coeffi-
cents are set as zeros. Thus, in order to make the prediction
accuracy of Wavg ∗X with |Wavg|= 7×7 (=0.1515) grow
toward that of Wavg ∗X with |Wavg| = 3 × 3 (=0.8329).
in Figure 11b, 3 × 3 coefficients of the centroid in 7 × 7
Wavg are filled with ones and other coefficients except the
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3 × 3 coefficients are set as small values (i.e. < 1) as the
distance from the centroid increases. As the result, in Figure
11c, Pr[Ytrue|X] ≈ Pr[Ytrue|Wavg ∗ X] and Algorithm
1 mitigates Xadv very well to have the good prediction
accuracy (i.e. Pr[Ytrue|JPEG(Algorithm1(Xadv))] =
0.5377). However, we do not know the size of the Wavg
(where all coefficients are ones) to make Pr[Ytrue|X] ≈
Pr[Ytrue|Wavg ∗X] as well as which coefficients are the
best suited for the mitigation of Xadv when Pr[Ytrue|X]
6≈ Pr[Ytrue|Wavg ∗ X] because Xadv is just given for
the mitigation process (corresponding to Algorithm 1 in
this paper). Therefore, the ways to make Pr[Ytrue|X] ≈
Pr[Ytrue|Wavg ∗X] for any given Xadv need to be further
studied.
